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THE BENEFITS OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN COMMON INTEREST 
DEVELOPMENT DISPUTES 
CHRISTOPHER BAUM† 
Feuding with one’s neighbor is an American tradition.1  
Robert Frost aptly expressed this sentiment in his famous line, 
“Good fences make good neighbours.”2  People take their living 
situation seriously, and they become irritated when their 
neighbors interfere with their rights or invade their privacy.  
Small disputes can often fester into hatred and strife.  Moreover, 
once the relationship between neighbors has soured, it can be 
difficult or impossible to repair.  These problems worsen when 
neighbors live close to one another.  In common interest 
developments, such as condominiums (“condos”) and cooperatives 
(“co-ops”), neighbors share walls, elevators, lawns, and common 
areas.  These close quarters make the potential for discord 
between neighbors more likely among them than among owners 
of single family homes who do not share these common areas. 
Like relationships between neighbors, tenants’ relationships 
with their landlords can also be contentious.3  In recent years, 
the condo or co-op board of directors (the “board”) has become a 
 
† Christopher J. Baum is a founding partner of Baum & Bailey, P.C. Mr. Baum’s 
practice focuses primarily on litigation, real estate, and bankruptcy matters. Prior to 
founding Baum & Bailey, P.C., he was an associate at a major New York law firm 
practicing in both the corporate and litigation aspects of bankruptcy and financial 
restructuring.  He assisted in the representation of debtors in possession, lenders, 
secured and unsecured creditors, and trustees. Mr. Baum graduated from the St. 
John’s University School of law, magna cum laude. He is admitted to practice in 
New York and New Jersey and in the United States District Courts for the Southern 
and Eastern District of New York and the District of New Jersey. 
1 See, e.g., LAWRENCE D. HATFIELD, THE TRUE STORY OF THE HATFIELD AND 
MCCOY FEUD (1944) (detailing the infamous dispute between two neighboring 
families on the West Virginia-Kentucky border). 
2 Robert Frost, Mending Wall, in NORTH OF BOSTON 12 (1914). 
3 See Scott E. Mollen, Alternate Dispute Resolution of Condominium and 
Cooperative Conflicts, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 75, 75 (1999) (noting that the landlord-
tenant relationship is the most passionate relationship next to love or sex). 
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surrogate for the landlord.4  The board handles noise complaints, 
collects maintenance fees, and enforces a variety of other rules 
and regulations.  The board’s paternalistic role may create  
animosity and resentment in condo or co-op residents, many of 
whom are forced to comply with rules that they glossed over 
when they purchased their unit. 
More people are living in condos and co-ops than ever 
before.5  For a variety of reasons, the demand for this type of 
housing is likely to continue.6  As more people move into common 
interest developments, the number of disputes and the amount of 
litigation will continue to increase.7 
Because litigation is expensive and time-consuming, both 
common interest development boards and unit owners suffer 
when parties bring their disputes to court.  Alternative dispute 
resolution (“ADR”) is an important solution.  This Article will 
examine the rise of common interest development ownership, the 
increase in conflicts in common interest developments, the 
disadvantages of traditional litigation, the advantages of ADR, 
and the various forms of ADR in other jurisdictions. 
I. THE INCREASE IN CONDO AND CO-OP OWNERSHIP 
During the last quarter century, the United States real 
estate market has seen a dramatic increase in condo and co-op 
ownership.8  Between 1970 and 2006, the number of common 
interest developments has expanded from 10,000 communities 
 
4 See, e.g., Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condos. Homeowners Ass’n, 941 P.2d 218, 
220–21 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that a condominium board owes the same duties to a 
resident as a landlord owes to a tenant). 
5 See Patrick J. Rohan, Preparing Community Associations for the Twenty-First 
Century: Anticipating the Legal Problems and Possible Solutions, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 3 (1999) (discussing the tremendous growth in condo and co-op ownership in 
recent years); see also Mollen, supra note 3, at 77–79 (discussing various economic 
and social changes that have led to increased numbers of common interest 
developments). 
6 See Rohan, supra note 5, at 5–10 (detailing a variety of reasons for the 
increase in condo and co-op ownership); see also Mollen, supra note 3, at 77–79. 
7 Lawrence M. Grosberg, Using Mediation To Resolve Residential Co-op 
Disputes: The Role of New York Law School, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 499, 504 (2002) 
(“Indeed, for at least a couple of reasons, the rate of increase in conflicts is probably 
much greater than the growth rate in the numbers of co-op residents.”). 
8 See Michael H. Schill et al., The Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An 
Empirical Analysis of Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 275–76 
(2007) (noting that the number of condos and co-ops has increased 227% from 1982 
to 2007). 
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with 701,000 housing units to 286,000 communities with 23.1 
million units.9  Although the increase has occurred across the 
country, it has been particularly acute in New York City.10  One 
commentator predicts that in the future the rental market will 
“all but disappear in every major city.”11 
Both legal and social changes have caused this increase in 
condo and co-op ownership.  America’s aging population is one 
cause.12  As people get older and their children leave home, they 
often sell their large houses to avoid significant physical upkeep 
and mortgage payments.13  Common interest developments 
usually require less maintenance, which is often provided by the 
development, and mortgage payments for common interest 
developments are lower.  Moreover, the elderly become 
increasingly infirm, and nursing homes and assisted living 
communities are often organized as common interest 
developments.14   
The emergence of the two-income family has also led to an 
increased demand for common interest developments.15  Leisure 
time becomes scarcer when both the husband and wife work.  
After a long day of work, they want to spend time with their 
families, without the chores and responsibilities of a large single-
family home.  Moreover, they appreciate the amenities that most 
condos and co-ops offer, such as laundry, dry cleaning, and 
housekeeping services.  Even without these services, people 
prefer condos and co-ops because they can avoid the maintenance 




9 G. Stephen Elisha & Tracey S. Wiltgen, ADR Spotlight: Resolving 
Condominium Disputes: Mediation Works, 10 HAW. B.J. 12, 12 (2006). 
10 See Schill et al., supra note 8, at 278 (noting that New York City condo and co-
op ownership has increased from fifteen percent to thirty percent of owner occupied 
housing); see also Shannon Behnken, High Rises, High Stakes, TAMPA TRIB., July 31, 
2005, at 1 (explaining the recent increase in condominiums on Florida’s west coast); 
Melinda Fulmer, The Great American Condo Glut, MSN REAL ESTATE, available at  
http://www.kevintomlinson.com/article-detail.php?article_id=337 (commenting on 
condominium growth throughout the United States). 
11 Rohan, supra note 5, at 4. 
12 Id. at 8–9. 
13 Grosberg, supra note 7, at 503; Mollen, supra note 3, at 78–79. 
14 Rohan, supra note 5, at 4. 
15 Grosberg, supra note 7, at 503; Mollen, supra  note 3, at 78. 
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Other social concerns also explain the increase in condo and 
co-op ownership.  One such concern is the increased desire for 
home security.16  Common interest developments are often gated 
communities that have their own security personnel.17  These 
developments prevent nonmembers from entering the 
community.  Moreover, common interest developments afford 
people the opportunity to live closer to where they work.18  
Suburban sprawl has increased the number of cars on the road 
and increased commute times.19  Condos and co-ops located in 
major metropolitan areas offer people an alternative to the hour-
long commute associated with living in a single family home in 
the suburbs.  Furthermore, those people who are not necessarily 
motivated by a shorter commute from suburbia may nonetheless 
be attracted to common interest developments for their 
recreational facilities.20 
In addition to social factors, changes in state and federal law 
have also increased the number of common interest 
developments,21 notably tax rules, land-use regulations, and 
zoning laws.  Traditionally, a landlord’s depreciation deduction 
on real property decreases every year and eventually 
disappears.22  The landlord’s mortgage interest deductions also 
decrease and ultimately end.23  When a building is no longer a 
tax shelter, the landlord is enticed to convert the building into a 
condo or a co-op.24  Tax laws also encourage renters to support 
condo and co-op conversions, or to move to common interest 
 
16 Grosberg, supra note 7, at 503; Mollen, supra note 3, at 79. 
17 See Rohan, supra note 5, at 9 n.17 (noting that the elderly seek out condos 
and co-ops in gated communities that provide “monitoring of visitors and night 
ground patrol by association personnel”). 
18 Grosberg, supra note 7, at 503; Mollen, supra note 3, at 78. 
19 See OLIVER GILLHAM, THE LIMITLESS CITY: A PRIMER ON THE URBAN SPRAWL 
DEBATE 93 (2002) (suggesting that sprawl has resulted in roads that are 
“overwhelmed” and “hours spent driving and stuck in traffic”). 
20 See Rohan, supra note 5, at 7–8 (discussing the demand for condos and co–ops 
that provide amenities such as golf courses, tennis courts, and swimming pools). 
21 See Evan McKenzie, Reinventing Common Interest Developments: Reflections 
on a Policy Role for the Judiciary, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 397, 400 (1998) 
(discussing state and federal approaches to the regulation of common interest 
developments). 
22 Rohan, supra note 5, at 6. 
23 See id. 
24 This is especially true in light of the other risks and liabilities that the 
landlord may face. Landlords face a minefield of legal issues, ranging from tort 
actions for failure to properly maintain the building to potential liability for injuries 
caused by tenants’ pets. 
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developments, as mortgage interest is a tax-deductible expense.25  
Conversions benefit tenants by enabling them to remain in their 
home while becoming an owner rather than a renter.  On the 
other hand, tenants generally cannot deduct residential rent.26 
Land use regulations that limit the amount of development 
space have also increased incentives to build condos and co-ops.  
Scott Mollen, a leading condo and co-op practitioner, notes that 
“as development expands, land use regulation becomes more 
restrictive[,] thereby increasing the cost of property 
development.”27  Condos and co-ops offer developers the 
opportunity to fit more units on smaller parcels of land.  The 
developers can then take advantage of “cluster” housing 
ordinances in local zoning codes that allow them to build high 
density units, while preserving undeveloped open spaces.28 
Additionally, local governments may not have the budget to 
build new infrastructure, such as public roads and sewage 
treatment facilities.29  Developers, consequently, turn to condos 
and co-ops over single-family houses to spread maintenance costs 
among the residents.30  By minimizing the amount of land per 
housing unit, condos and co-ops offer developers the opportunity 
to maximize profits and minimize zoning obstacles. 
Major legislative changes in the 1980s dramatically 
increased co-op ownership in New York City.  Post World War II 
rent regulations had eliminated many economic incentives to 
owning rental property.31  The New York City legislature 
changed these laws, streamlining the conversion process from 
rental property to co-ops, which enabled many landlords to 
 
25 26 U.S.C. § 163 (2006). 
26 See id. The I.R.S. tax code does not allow a deduction for residential rental 
expenses. 
27 Mollen, supra note 3, at 78. 
28 See Rohan, supra note 5, at 8 (citing Tom Pierce, Note, A Constitutionally 
Valid Justification for the Enactment of No-Growth Ordinances: Integrating 
Concepts of Population Stabilization and Sustainability, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 93, 144 
n.72 (1997)) (cluster housing is the concept of allowing high density housing units to 
preserve the surrounding open space). 
29 See id. (“Faced with restrictive municipal fiscal policies, the developer has 
little choice but to create a home owner association to administer the private roads 
and other facilities after the builder’s departure.”). 
30 See id. 
31 Id. at 6–7 (noting that rent control had led to landlords neglecting to maintain 
their buildings and investors becoming disinterested in building new rental housing 
in New York City). 
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convert their rental apartments into co-ops.32  Furthermore, the 
New York State legislature amended the New York Banking Law 
in ways that encouraged more lending to co-op purchasers.33  
Along with zoning laws, these changes demonstrate how state 
and local governments have facilitated the growth in common 
interest developments. 
Lastly, economic incentives have contributed to the rise of 
common interest developments.  Rental building owners are 
faced with skyrocketing operating costs,34 which often compel 
them to simply “cash out” of their buildings and convert them 
into condos or co-ops.  In fact, these costs may dissuade 
developers and real estate investors from building rental 
property in the first place. 
II. DISPUTES INVOLVING COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENT  
Owners in common interest developments generally get 
along with their neighbors35 and believe that the board acts in 
their best interest.36  Yet the increase in common interest 
developments has led to more disputes between residents and 
board members.37  In New York City, the problem was so 
pronounced that a separate court was created to deal with co-op 
and condo disputes.38  One study found that “nearly two-thirds of 
co-op and condominium associations in New York City had filed 
lawsuits [between 1993 and 1996].”39  This number does not 
 
32 See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eeee(1)(b)–(c) (McKinney 2010); see also 
Grosberg, supra note 7, at 501 (stating that because the number of tenants required 
to approve a conversion of a building from rental to co-op was reduced from fifty 
percent to fifteen percent, there were many more buildings that converted). 
33 See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 235(8-a) (McKinney 2010); see also Grosberg, supra 
note 7, at 502. 
34 See Rohan, supra note 5, at 6–7 (discussing rising expenses such as fuel costs, 
insurance, utilities, labor, compliance with local regulations, potential tort claims, 
environmental regulations, and discrimination suits that may drive building owners 
out of the rental market). 
35 See Elisha & Wiltgen, supra note 9, at 14 (citing a poll that found that eight-
six percent of community association members get along “well” with their neighbors 
and sixty-three percent get along “very well” with their neighbors). 
36 See Found. for Cmty. Ass’n Research, 2009 National Research, 
http://www.cairf.org/research/survey_homeowner.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). 
37 Grosberg, supra note 7, at 503–04. 
38 Jay Romano, Your Home: Co-op Cases Are Getting Own Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 26, 1997, § 11, at 3. 
39 Jay Romano, Your Home: Reducing Legal Costs in a Co-op, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
18, 1996, § 9, at 2. 
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include the lawsuits that residents filed.40  In fact, the number of 
common interest development disputes has risen faster than the 
overall number of residents in such developments.41 
Commentators have described this spike in litigation as 
inevitable, given the tight quarters in common interest 
developments.42  The close proximity of neighbors is often the 
catalyst for what have been described as “quality of life” 
disputes,43 which usually involve things such as noise, odors, pet 
issues, use of common areas, and personal disputes among 
tenants.  Although these disputes usually involve little or no 
money, they spark deep resentment and strife between the 
parties.  While similar issues arise in residential rental 
buildings, condo and co-op dwellers have an ownership interest 
and usually react more strongly.44  People are much more 
committed to “preserving the physical as well as aesthetic 
desirability of their homes when they own them, as opposed to 
when they rent them.”45  Accordingly, common interest owners 
manifest great care and concern for their units because they have 
a large emotional and financial interest. 
Quality of life conflicts usually arise in one of two ways.  The 
first type of dispute is between neighbors and often develops 
when one neighbor is doing, or not doing, something that affects 
the other neighbor.  Loud music or second-hand smoke can turn 
an occasional irritation into an unbearable daily annoyance.  
Moreover, the daily contact between neighbors in condos and co-
ops exacerbates this disharmony. 
 
 
40 See id. (quoting attorney Bruce Cholst, who describes a co-op where “one 
shareholder filed no fewer than 12 lawsuits”). 
41 Id. 
42 See Grosberg, supra note 7. 
43 See, e.g., Richard Siegler, Cooperatives and Condominiums: Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 1997, at 3 (containing a sample mediation 
clause for condos and co-ops that defines a “ ‘quality of life’ issue [as] any 
nonmonetary issue”). 
44 See Romano, supra note 38 (“ ‘[T]here is a fundamental difference between 
disputes in co-ops and those in rental buildings . . . . In co-ops, the tenants are also 
the owners. And a judge can’t just apply landlord-tenant law . . . without thinking 
about that difference.’ ” (quoting Marc Luxemburg, a New York attorney and 
President of the Council of New York Cooperatives)). 
45 Grosberg, supra note 7, at 505 (discussing the various reasons why there is a 
higher number of disputes between condo and co-op owners than other neighbors 
and noting the change in status from renter to homeowner as one such reason). 
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Second, quality of life disputes arise when a condo or co-op 
owner has acted, or wants to act, in a manner that violates the 
development’s rules and regulations.46  Most people never read 
the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“restrictions”) that 
govern common interest developments.47  Conflicts often erupt 
when condo or co-op owners discover that there are restrictions 
on their use of their property.48  Although the types of restrictions 
vary, they usually cover issues such as parking, pet ownership, 
use of recreational facilities, and subleasing.49  The owner of a 
unit in a common interest development has less control over his 
property than the owner of a typical single family house.50  The 
restrictions can seem arbitrary and paternalistic to owners who 
feel that the unit is their property and that they should be 
entitled to do with it as they please.  Additionally, disputes can 
occur because these restrictions are often dated and may not 
comply with new laws—for example, anti-smoking or recycling 
regulations.51  Also, ambiguously drafted rules may cause conflict 
because tenants are unsure of whether certain behaviors are 
prohibited.52  Condo and co-op owners who obey the rules may 
also resent other owners who are not complying with the 
restrictions but go unpunished.53  This may encourage some other 
owners to disregard the restrictions and, thereby, create friction 
with the board. 
 
46 See Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest Developments, 33 CAL. 
L. REVISION COMM’N REPORTS 689, 694 (2003), available at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/ 
pub/Printed-Reports/REC-CID-ADR.pdf (stating that covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions “inevitably lead[ ] to conflicts”). 
47 See Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, and CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle 
Common, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (“Only after [owners] have moved in and 
settled down do they discover that the development declaration contains a host of 
intrusive restrictions affecting their daily lives . . . .”). 
48 See Mollen, supra note 3, at 79 n.14 (citing Patrick J. Rohan, Cooperative 
Housing: An Appraisal of Residential Controls and Enforcement Procedures, 18 
STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (1966)) (suggesting that purchasers should be warned in 
advance of restrictions that may limit their rights as individual owners). 
49 See generally Realtor.com, What About the CC&Rs?, http://www.realtor.com/ 
BASICS/condos/ccr.asp?poe=realtor (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) (describing 
covenants, conditions, and restrictions in condos). 
50 See Grosberg, supra note 7. 
51 See Martin Librett, Change is Good!: Updating House Rules Helps Avoid 
Conflicts, COOPERATOR: CO-OP & CONDO MONTHLY, Oct. 1995, available at 
http://cooperator.com/articles/307/1/Change-is-Good/Page1.html. 
52 Id. 
53 Grosberg, supra note 7, at 504–05. 
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Aside from quality of life issues, another source of potential 
conflict in common interest developments are financial disputes 
involving such things as maintenance fees, common charges, and 
special assessments.54  The owners and the board members may 
disagree over who is responsible for certain fees and repairs.  
Relatively minor monetary disputes can spiral out of control and 
result in protracted litigation.55  Financial disputes may also 
relate to the common interest development’s restrictions.  Such 
disputes occur when owners feel that they are paying either 
(1) common charges for a problem that does not affect them or 
that they did not cause, or (2) for problems that directly affect 
them that they feel are the responsibility of the whole common 
interest development, as opposed to just one individual owner. 
Another source of disputes unique to co-ops is that the board 
has the power to deny a unit to any potential buyer, so long as 
the decision is not based on race, creed, religion, or other 
constitutionally prohibited criteria.56  This exercise of the board’s 
seemingly arbitrary powers may engender animosity.57  A 
situation may arise where a unit owner wants to sell his co-op 
quickly, but the sale is blocked by the board with little or no 
explanation.  A unit owner may also lose a desirable selling price 
because of board refusal.  Furthermore, the co-op owner may be 
unable to purchase a new home because the delay or failure of 
the board to approve the sale of his co-op prevents him from 
closing on his new property. 
Finally, conflicts between owners and the board may arise 
because the board is comprised of individuals who are not 
professional property managers.  The board in common interest 
developments is comprised of unit owners who generally lack 
experience in managing property.58  One commentator noted that 
board members “come from varied backgrounds and experiences, 
few of which prepare them for their job: the management of a 
 
54 See Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest Developments, supra 
note 46. 
55 See, e.g., Mary Voboril, How $909 Spat Cost $100,000 in Legal Fees, 
NEWSDAY, Mar. 6, 1994, at 20 (describing how a minor dispute involving the 
installation of window guards ultimately led to $100,000 in attorneys fees). 
56 See Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 434, 160 N.E.2d 720, 724, 
190 N.Y.S.2d 70, 75 (1959). 
57 See Grosberg, supra note 7, at 505. 
58 See James L. Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role of Community 
Associations, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1135, 1144 (1998). 
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complex, multimillion dollar property.”59  This lack of experience 
and professional expertise may perpetuate conflicts with unit 
owners because the occupants may be less willing to accept the 
board member’s authority.  Also, a board composed of laypeople 
is more likely to make legal mistake or violate procedures set 
forth in the bylaws.60  Similarly, a unit owner is more likely to 
question the decision of a board member with no prior real estate 
experience than the decisions of a professional owner.61  
Therefore, board members’ lack of professional expertise may 
contribute to conflicts in common interest developments. 
III. RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN COMMON INTEREST 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Litigation is often an unrealistic solution to relatively minor 
disputes that can arise in condos or co-ops.  When disputes erupt 
between neighbors regarding noise, foul odors, or other quality of 
life matters, it is usually cost prohibitive for the aggrieved party 
to bring a lawsuit.  Even in small claims court, the cost of filing 
the lawsuit, missing time from work, and traveling to and from 
the court house dissuades individuals from bringing the dispute 
to court.  For cases not in small claims court, a party must also 
incur the cost of an attorney, an additional barrier that makes 
the prospect of litigation even more daunting.  For these reasons, 
ADR is particularly well-suited to resolve minor issues in condos 
and co-ops.  Mediation in particular can help bring about just 
results in a cost effective manner. 
A. Weaknesses of Litigation for Resolving Disputes in Condos 
and Co-ops 
There are several reasons why litigation is not the most 
effective means of resolving disputes in common interest 
developments.  The most compelling reason is the cost of 
litigation.  Acknowledging the high cost of litigation, the famous 
French philosopher Voltaire commented, “I was never ruined but 
 
59 Elisha & Wiltgen, supra note 9, at 14. 
60 Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest Developments, supra note 
46, at 693. 
61 Mollen, supra note 3, at 81; see also Grosberg, supra note 7, at 506; Wayne S. 
Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 303, 379 (2006) (suggesting that common interest developments may hire 
professional board members to aid the board in policy decisions). 
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twice; once when I lost a lawsuit and once when I won one.”62  
Litigation can be a very expensive process, especially if a party 
has to pay an attorney by the hour.  Because condo and co-op 
disputes do not usually involve dollar amounts that justify 
residents hiring attorneys on a contingency fee basis, the cost of 
litigation makes “the courts inaccessible to large sections of the 
poor and middle class.”63  This is particularly true when the 
source of the controversy is quality of life issues.  In one 
particularly egregious and infamous case, a unit owner and the 
board argued over who bore the responsibility to install window 
guards at a cost of $909; $100,000 in combined legal fees later, 
the controversy was resolved.64  One co-op owner involved in the 
dispute recognized that “[a]nything you can possibly do to avoid a 
lawsuit, do it.”65  It is almost axiomatic in condo and co-op 
disputes that the “cost of litigation necessary to resolve these 
disputes is often disproportionate to the character of the 
dispute.”66  For this reason, litigation should be the last resort for 
condo and co-op residents.  Unfortunately, the prospect of high 
litigation expenses causes many legitimate grievances to go 
unresolved.  In these cases, truly wronged parties suffer solely 
for want of an effective method of achieving relief.67 
Neither party’s interests are served by high legal bills in a 
dispute involving little or no money.  Individual owners are 
particularly affected by the high cost of litigation because they 
have to bear the full cost themselves.  In contrast, the board can 
spread the cost among unit owners in the form of a special 
assessment charge and, therefore, may be more aggressive in 
pursuing litigation.68  It should be noted, however, that the 
 
62 AN EDITOR’S TREASURY: A CONTINUING ANTHOLOGY OF PROSE, VERSE, AND 
LITERARY CURIOSA 1032 (Herbert R. Mayes ed., 1968). 
63 ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., NEGOTIATION 22 (3d ed. 2006). 
64 See Voboril, supra note 55. 
65 Wade Lambert, Ever Hear the One About the Lawyers and the Window Bars?, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1994, at A1. 
66 Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest Developments, supra note 
46, at 695. 
67 See Nathan K. DeDino, Note, When Fences Aren’t Enough: The Use of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution to Resolve Disputes Between Neighbors, 18 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 887, 890–91 (2003). 
68 See Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest Developments, supra 
note 46, at 695–96 (noting that the owner involved in the dispute is forced to 
partially fund the board’s litigation through assessments that apply to all owners). 
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“highest component of any co-op’s legal expenses is litigation.”69  
Legal fees quickly mount as time passes, and both parties become 
entrenched in their position.  Discovery devices and motion 
practice are often used as weapons to drive up the other side’s 
costs to force a settlement.  When the costs of appeals are added 
on, it is easy to see how litigation expenses can spiral out of 
control, especially when parties become irrationally entrenched 
in their positions. 
Another weakness of litigation is the time it takes to get a 
final ruling.  From pleadings through final appeals, the legal 
process compares to watching paint dry: slow and tedious.  
Lawsuits can take several years or even a decade from start to 
finish.  This problem is even more pronounced in courts that 
allow interlocutory appeals, as these appeals add significant time 
to the process.70  Additionally, in many jurisdictions, the judicial 
system is congested and overcrowded, and cases take significant 
time to be resolved.71  Court congestion is doubly problematic 
because (1) it delays hearings for substantial periods of time, and 
(2) when those hearings actually occur, they are often rushed to 
accommodate the hundred or more other cases that judges have 
on their calendars.72  Even when litigation can solve an owner’s 
problems, the long wait to resolve a noise or odor dispute is far 
from ideal. 
Litigation also lacks flexibility in the sense that parties 
cannot choose who will ultimately settle their dispute.  The 
parties must give over their control of the outcome to a judge or 
jury.  The parties do not get the luxury of choosing what judge 
they want and at most get a minimal amount of say over what 
jurors will serve if the case progresses to a jury trial.73  One 
 
69 Romano, supra note 39 (quoting Bruce Cholst, a Manhattan attorney who 
focuses on condominium law). 
70 See, e.g., Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995) (observing that an 
interlocutory appeal “can threaten [court] proceedings with delay [and] add[ed] 
costs”). 
71 See generally Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil 
Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 813–14 (2000) (discussing the 
congestion in civil courts and analyzing obstacles to reform). 
72 See Mollen, supra note 3, at 86–87. 
73 See Jay Romano, Mediation an Option for Housing Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
5, 2006, § 11, at 10 (citing Daniel Weitz, Chairman of the New York City Bar 
Association Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution, who noted that one of the 
major drawbacks to litigation is that “the parties surrender control of the outcome to 
a judge or jury”). 
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commentator noted that in litigation: “the judge may be fully 
versed in the law but not necessarily the nuances of the field.”74  
Furthermore, neither a judge in a bench trial nor a jury has any 
specialized knowledge in the area under which the dispute arose.  
Most judges also do not have the time to adequately familiarize 
themselves with the facts of the case or the context under which 
the dispute arose.75  Judges or juries cannot achieve a level of 
expertise—that is available when parties appoint their own 
decisionmakers—in areas such as “law, economic issues, and 
practical ramifications relating to the condo-co-op context.”76  The 
time and effort needed to educate a decisionmaker about the 
context in which the dispute arose contributes to the cost of 
litigation.77 
Furthermore, the judicial system is limited in the relief that 
it can provide and its ability to craft solutions that benefit both 
parties.  When litigation finishes, there is always a “winner” and 
a “loser.”78  Even for the winner, litigation can result in a Pyrrhic 
victory because of the time, cost, and an unsatisfying resolution.  
Because courts are bound to follow statutes and precedents, they 
may be unable to craft equitable and appropriate relief for the 
parties.79  In a lawsuit, both sides must operate within the 
formalistic framework of legal procedure to prove their case.  The 
relief afforded in litigation can also be inadequate in 
circumstances where relevant, but inadmissible, evidence is not 
 
74 Liz Lent, A Guide to Alternative Dispute Resolution: Finding a Better 
Solution, THE COOPERATOR: THE CO-OP & CONDO MONTHLY, Oct. 2007, available at 
http://www.cooperator.com/articles/1510/1/A-Guide-to-Alternative-Dispute-
Resolution/Page1.html. 
75 See id. 
76 Mollen, supra note 3, at 87. But see Romano, supra note 38 (detailing New 
York’s creation of a special court to deal with condo and co-op disputes. Judith Kaye, 
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, stated that “[t]he idea is to allow the 
judges . . . to have a special area of law they can focus on.”). 
77 See Walter D. Goldsmith, Arbitration Law: Cooperative and Condominium 
Disputes, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 21, 1994, at 3. 
78 See Jeffrey Krivis, Benefits of Mediation: High Success Rate, Low Cost, CORP. 
COUNSELLOR, Oct. 1994, available at http://www.firstmediation.com/resources/ 
?p=16. 
79 See 2 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: 
COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE—FORMS § 11.10, at 11-26 (2010); see 
also Jay Romano, Your Home: Mediation Instead of Litigation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 
1998, § 11, at 3 (“[T]here’s a category of cases out there that can never get righted in 
a courtroom . . . . When cases like that end up in court everybody loses.” (quoting 
Richard Nardi, Chairman of the New York City Bar Association Committee on 
Cooperative and Condominium Law)). 
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taken into account by the trier of fact.80  Conversely, limitations 
in the substantive law may force a party to seek relief that is 
greater in scope than actually desired.81  Some courts have called 
litigation “overkill” when it develops because of a minor common 
interest development dispute.82  The court normally has three 
options when granting relief: (1) it can award monetary damages, 
(2) grant a permanent injunction, or (3) compel a party to carry 
out specific performance of its contractual duties.  Yet a court can 
grant specific performance or an injunction only when a party 
demonstrates that monetary damages would be inadequate.83  
This is often very difficult or impossible to prove.84  Therefore, 
litigation usually results in solutions that are defined by either 
either statutory law or common law as opposed to the needs of 
the parties involved.85 
Another shortfall of litigation in the condo and co-op context 
is the public nature of litigation.86  Litigation allows fellow unit 
owners, friends, business associates, and others to learn details 
of a dispute that may be personal and potentially embarrassing.87  
 
80 See N.Y. CITY BAR, MEDIATE (DON’T LITIGATE) YOUR CO-OP/CONDO 
RESIDENTIAL DISPUTE 4, available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/Mediate%28Don% 
27t%20Litigate%29_brochure.pdf (noting that mediation allows the parties to “tell 
their whole story,” instead of a judge or jury who decides a case based on the 
admitted evidence). 
81 See DeDino, supra note 67, at 894 (discussing two cases where plaintiffs were 
forced to seek remedies that were disproportionate to the problems they were facing 
because those were the only remedies available); see also Press Release, N.Y. City 
Bar Ass’n, Co-Op & Condo Mediation Project: A New Public Service for Resolving 
Disputes (Oct. 11, 1996), http://www.nycbar.org/PressRoom/PressRelease/ 
2006_1019.htm (describing litigation in condos and co-ops as “heavy-handed”). 
82 See 1 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: 
CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE—FORMS § 43.05[5][a] (2010) (citing Kirou v. 
Oceanside Plaza Condo. Ass’n, 425 So. 2d 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), where the 
court chided the plaintiff for wasting an overburdened court’s time with the trivial 
matters in a case involving dogs “disgrac[ing]” themselves in common areas); see also 
Tower Forty-One Ass’n v. Levitt, 426 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
83 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 357–69 (1981). 
84 See, e.g., Jenny R. Turner, Preinvention Assignment Agreement Breach: A 
Practical Alternative to Specific Performance or Unqualified Injunction, 5 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 631, 642 (1998). 
85 See Lent, supra note 74. 
86 See MEDIATE (DON’T LITIGATE) YOUR CO-OP/CONDO RESIDENTIAL DISPUTE, 
supra note 80. 
87 See Mollen, supra note 3, at 89; see also ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION COMM. & 
COMM. ON ARBITRATION, ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE REOSLUTION: HOW TO RESOLVE YOUR DISPUTE WITHOUT GOING TO COURT 
2 (1996) [hereinafter HOW TO RESOLVE YOUR DISPUTE WITHOUT GOING TO COURT], 
available at http://www.abcny.org/Publications/ADR.htm. 
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The Internet makes legal papers readily accessible to anyone who 
is inclined to investigate a dispute.  The exposure of these 
litigation details could have negative business consequences as 
well.  For example, parties to a business transaction often run 
background checks on one another.88  These background checks 
reveal any past or pending litigation, and the existence of 
litigation may be interpreted as a sign of strife in the common 
interest development and negatively impact its value.89  
Moreover, a resident who wants to sell his co-op and move into a 
new one may find the new co-op board reluctant to approve his 
purchase because they view him as litigious.90  The board 
members themselves may have similar problems if they are 
named individually as defendants in a lawsuit.91 
Furthermore, litigation in common interest developments 
may reduce the value of all units by highlighting the building’s 
structural or operational problems.92  Potential purchasers may 
avoid a building that is embroiled in a lawsuit because they fear 
the board will levy a special assessment to fund the litigation.93  
Lawsuits may also draw the attention of regulatory agencies, 
which can conduct inspections and force the development to 
make expensive repairs.  These repairs would require more 
special assessments and would also necessitate construction in 
the building, as well as the temporary chaos that accompanies 
it.94 
The publicity accompanying a dispute may also further 
entrench the parties in their respective positions.  The board does 
not want to appear weak because it wants to discourage future 
litigation.  Likewise, residents may be unwilling to compromise 
for fear that others will perceive them as a rabble-rouser lest 
they are vindicated with a victory in court.  This same mentality 
may apply in a dispute between two neighbors, as both want to 
save face if their dispute becomes a matter of public knowledge.  
 
88 See Mollen, supra note 3, at 89. 
89 Id.; see also 1 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 82, at § 54.05[5] (noting that the 
value of condominiums with “a reputation for disputes and turmoil” is negatively 
impacted). 
90 See Romano, supra note 39 (quoting Bruce Cholst, a Manhattan condo and co-
op attorney). 
91 See Mollen, supra note 3, at 90. 
92 Id. at 89. 
93 Id. at 89–90. 
94 Id. 
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Therefore, the public nature of litigation creates a litany of issues 
that contribute to the overall shortcomings of litigation as a tool 
to resolve disputes in common interest developments. 
Finally, litigation in common interest developments can lead 
to long lasting animosity among residents or between residents 
and board members.  Unlike other types of lawsuits, litigation in 
condo and co-op disputes involves two parties who are going to 
have to see each other on a regular basis.95  This can lead to a 
hostile environment not only for the disputants but also for the 
other unit owners.  Litigation is a contentious process, and 
attorneys do not usually consider the longterm ramifications of 
the battle.  The litigation process is not well suited to deal with 
disputes among parties with close relationships.96  Lawyers are 
trained to zealously and vigorously represent their clients in 
disputes, but this mentality may permanently ruin relationships.  
A person who misses work, pays for an attorney, and devotes his 
free time to dealing with litigation will naturally come to resent 
the other party in the case.97  The more money and time spent on 
litigation, the more hostility that develops between the parties.98 
The negative impact of litigation is clearly illustrated in 360 
Owners Corp. v. Diacou, where, in a dispute over who was 
responsible for paying $909 to install window guards, the court 
awarded the board $30,000 in legal fees; the remaining $43,000 
in fees was to be collected through a special assessment on the 
co-op share owners.99  One can imagine how the other unit 
owners felt towards the resident who sued the board upon 
receiving an assessment for their share of the legal bill.  One 
commentator noted that “[t]o the community and individuals 
involved . . . these disputes may be a festering sore that needs to 
be dealt with quickly and effectively to ensure a healthily 
functioning community.”100  For the foregoing reasons, litigation 
is certainly not the best method to resolve disputes between 
parties who will have a continued relationship after the dispute 
is concluded. 
 
95 See Grosberg, supra note 7, at 506. 
96 See DeDino, supra note 67, at 897. 
97 See Mollen, supra note 3, at 88. 
98 Id. 
99 See Lambert, supra note 65; see also Counsel Is Awarded $30,000 Fee in Battle 
Over $900 Co-op Windows, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 23, 1994, at 21. 
100 1 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 82. 
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B. Use of Arbitration in Condo and Co-op Disputes 
ADR offers an effective substitute for litigation.  One method 
of ADR that a condo or co-op board should consider is arbitration.  
Simply put, “[a]rbitration is the submission of a dispute to one or 
more impartial persons for a final and binding decision, known as 
an ‘award.’ ”101  Arbitration can be either a formal or an informal 
process.  Formal arbitration includes matters submitted before 
the Arbitration Association of America or the Judicial Arbitration 
and Mediation Services (“JAMS”).  These associations have well 
defined guidelines and rules that govern arbitrations before 
them.102  In the context of common interest developments, 
informal arbitration can include disputes between neighbors that 
are arbitrated by the condo or co-op board or disputes that are 
submitted to community justice centers.103 
Arbitration can either be binding or nonbinding on the 
parties.  If arbitration is binding, the parties have very limited 
rights of appeal.  Arbitration can be implemented in three ways: 
(1) the board can modify the common interest developments rules 
or bylaws to require arbitration;104 (2) the parties to a dispute can 
voluntarily agree to submit their dispute to arbitration;105 or 
(3) arbitration may be required in some states for condo and co-
op disputes.  Arbitration has several benefits over litigation.  
There are, however, several limitations that should also be 
considered. 
The chief benefit of arbitration over litigation is that it 
reduces costs in a variety of ways.  The cost of arbitrating 
common interest disputes involving quality of life issues is 




101 American Arbitration Association, Arbitration, http://www.adr.org/arb_med 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
102 For the JAMS alternative dispute resolution rules, see JAMS Comprehensive 
Arbitration Rules & Procedures, http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/rules.asp (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2010). The American Arbitration Association’s rules are available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28749 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
103 For a discussion of the virtues of Community Justice Centers, see DeDino, 
supra note 67, at 904–05. 
104 See Librett, supra note 51. 
105 Romano, supra note 39. 
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the amount of money in controversy.106  Even if a party refuses to 
compromise, the case can still be decided at a fraction of the time 
and cost.107 
Another reason that costs are lower in arbitration is that 
disputes are resolved quicker.108  This advantage is highlighted in 
one case where an arbitration involving hundreds of millions of 
dollars was resolved within six months.109  The disputes in 
common interest developments are normally small and could be 
decided even faster than a multimillion dollar dispute.  The 
arbitrator’s ability to fix a hearing schedule that cannot be 
altered also helps eliminate unnecessary delays.110  This prevents 
the parties from delaying the case to increase arbitration costs 
and force an unfair settlement.  The faster a dispute is settled, 
the less money is spent on attorney fees and other litigation 
related expenses.  Therefore, the speed of arbitration enhances 
its cost effectiveness. 
Furthermore, arbitration is a cost effective alternative to 
litigation because it does not have litigation’s rigid procedural 
formalities.  For example, arbitration is typically commenced by 
a party writing a simple demand for arbitration, as opposed to 
filing a complex summons and complaint.111  These less formal 
procedural rules again help lower costs because they allow 
attorneys to spend less time dealing with procedural hurdles and 
more time focusing on substantive matters.  Allowing the 
attorneys to concentrate on substance enables them to more 
effectively evaluate their client’s position and possibly encourage 
the parties to settle. 
By streamlining these procedural aspects, arbitration is 
more likely to arrive at a result based on the merits of the 
dispute, as opposed to a result based on technical procedural 
points.  If the parties wish to apply specific procedural rules, they 
 
106 See Jay Romano, Your Home: Intervening to Resolve Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 8, 2002, § 11, at 5. 
107 See Abigail Pessen, Letter to the Editor, Choosing Mediation over 
Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000, § 11, at 8 (noting that arbitration is very 
similar to litigation, except it is cheaper and faster). 
108 See Irwin Kahn, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Win-Win Proposition, 28 
NYSBA ONE ON ONE 1, 9 (Summer/Fall 2007). 
109 Claudia H. Deutsch, Bank Buying the Building Named for It, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 1, 1994, at 4D. 
110 Goldsmith, supra note 77. 
111 Romano, supra note 106. 
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are free to stipulate to these rules in the arbitration 
agreement.112  The lack of procedural formality also reduces costs 
by diminishing or eliminating the need for an attorney, especially 
in relatively minor quality of life disputes.113  Therefore, a party 
with less money is at less of a disadvantage in an arbitration 
proceeding.114 
Arbitration is also less contentious than litigation because 
the formal rules of evidence do not apply, unless the parties 
agree otherwise.115  Although arbitrators are typically guided by 
the rules of evidence, they are allowed to consider any material 
they deem proper.116  In fact, if an arbitrator refuses to admit 
relevant evidence, the award may be reversed on appeal.  
Therefore, arbitrators tend to admit less reliable forms of 
evidence and weigh the value of the evidence accordingly.117  For 
example, arbitrators routinely allow evidence in the form of 
affidavits that would be inadmissible as hearsay in litigation.118  
These less formal evidentiary standards allow a party to express 
his feelings regarding the dispute, which would clearly not be 
admissible under the normal rules of evidence applicable in 
litigation.119  By allowing parties to vent their frustrations and 
feelings to an arbitrator, arbitration provides a form of cathartic 
relief.  This may encourage settlement or, at the very least, give 
the parties greater satisfaction in the outcome of the arbitration 
because each party was allowed to “fully” present his side of the 
dispute. 
 
112 Mollen, supra note 3, at 92. 
113 Siegler, supra note 43. 
114 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: HOW TO RESOLVE YOUR DISPUTE 
WITHOUT GOING TO COURT, supra note 87. 
115 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 8:60, at 196 (3d ed. 
2005). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. § 8:61, at 196–97; see also ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., ARBITRATION 274 (4th 
ed. 2006) (“An arbitrator is . . . more likely to get into trouble by following the rules 
of evidence than by ignoring them—and far more likely to get into trouble by 
excluding evidence than by admitting it.”). 
118 RAU ET AL., supra note 117, at 273; see also 1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 8:61, 
at 196. 
119 1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 8:61, at 196; see also DWIGHT GOLANN & JAY 
FOLBERG, MEDIATION: THE ROLES OF ADVOCATE AND NEUTRAL 197 (2006) (“Highly 
emotional disputants, especially at the outset of a case, may need time to work 
through their feelings.”). 
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Furthermore, arbitration is a cheaper alternative to 
litigation because discovery in arbitration is very limited.120  
Discovery is often inconsistent with the goals of arbitration 
because it is frequently the most costly and prolonged element of 
a trial.121  Discovery in arbitration is less burdensome because 
arbitrators themselves can subpoena witnesses and documents 
that are necessary to make a final determination.122  When the 
arbitrator requests that a party produce evidence, the party will 
usually comply because a refusal could antagonize the arbitrator 
and hurt their case.123  Therefore, arbitration retains the 
necessary aspects of discovery and allows an arbitrator to limit or 
prevent discovery that is abusive, costly, or time consuming.  The 
limits on discovery in arbitration prevent an additional “layer of 
complexity and ‘legalism’ ” associated with litigation.124  Once 
again, this may allow a party to forego hiring an attorney in 
relatively minor disputes, thereby further reducing the party’s 
overall costs. 
Privacy is arbitration’s other major advantage over 
litigation.  In many instances the parties’ motivation for choosing 
arbitration is the privacy that it affords.125  In arbitration, 
neither the public nor the media are allowed to attend hearings 
or view the records.126  Moreover, there are usually no published 
opinions of the arbitrator’s final determination.127  Arbitration 
may, therefore, avoid costly damage to the parties’ reputations.128  
The parties’ business reputations are spared because they avoid 
 
120 See Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Arbitration Discovery, NAT’L L.J., 
Sept. 8, 2003, at 24. 
121 1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 8:20, at 184; see also RAU ET AL., supra note 117, 
at 280. 
122 See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, § 7, 7 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1999), available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29567&printable=true; see also 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
123 See RAU ET AL.,  supra note 117, at 280. 
124 Id. at 282. 
125 Edward J. Costello Jr., Whether and When To Use Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE LITIGATOR’S HANDBOOK 17, 
23 (Nancy F. Atlas et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE LITIGATOR’S HANDBOOK]; see 
also Justin M. Goldstein & Cassandra L. Seto, Keeping Private Arbitration Private, 
L.A. LAWYER, Feb. 2008, at 12. 
126 Costello, supra note 125. 
127 Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 1211, 1216 (2006). 
128 Id. at 1212. 
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the stigma of litigiousness.129  Similarly, the parties’ personal 
reputations are spared the embarrassment of private information 
being exposed to the public.130 
Private arbitrations also facilitate settlements because the 
parties do not have to worry about appearing “weak” to their 
neighbors.  The common interest development’s board can avoid 
setting negative legal precedent.  This way, other neighbors 
cannot rely on the arbitration result or settlement in similar 
disputes.  Realistically, a board may be willing to compromise in 
one isolated instance but unwilling to reach a similar agreement 
if it appears to be a trend in the development.  The common 
interest development residents, however, no longer have to worry 
about seeming weak in the eyes of their neighbors.  Because 
arbitration allows parties to settle their disputes privately, it 
gives residents an opportunity to compromise and still save 
face.131 
It is important to note that there is a distinction between 
“privacy” and “confidentiality” in arbitration.132  Although 
arbitration proceedings are not open to the public, parties to the 
arbitration are not necessarily prevented from disclosing what 
goes on during the course of the proceeding.  Absent an express 
agreement, there is no presumption of confidentiality.133  
Therefore, the parties may want to enter into a confidentiality 
agreement.  Yet either party may still end up in court attempting 
to have the arbitration award enforced or overturned.134  In this 
case, one or both of the parties may make a motion to have the 
court records sealed.135  Although this provides a solution to the 
confidentiality problem, having the records sealed is a difficult 
process, and a court may seal some documents but not others.136 
 
129 See, e.g., Mollen, supra note 3, at 89–90 (discussing the damage to one’s 
business reputation that can result from the publicity associated with litigation). 
130 See id. at 90. 
131 See Schmitz, supra note 127, at 1222–23.  
132 Id. at 1214–21; see also Goldstein & Seto, supra note 125, at 12–14 (noting 
the limits of privacy in arbitration and the potential for the results of arbitration 
proceedings to become public). 
133 See Anjanette H. Raymond, Confidentiality in a Forum of Last Resort: Is the 
Use of Confidential Arbitration a Good Idea for Business and Society?, 16 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 479, 493–95 (2005). 
134 Goldstein & Seto, supra note 125. 
135 Id. at 14. 
136 Id. (explaining the standard to have a record sealed, and noting that 
“[s]ealing orders must be narrowly tailored”). 
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Another significant benefit of arbitration over litigation is 
the ability to select arbitrators with expertise and specialized 
knowledge.137  By choosing arbitrators with knowledge in the 
area of the dispute, the parties can save time and money because 
they do not have to educate the decisionmaker.138  In fact, 
depending on the arbitration agreement, the parties may be able 
to choose an arbitrator who is familiar with the facts of the case 
before the arbitration begins.139  This may be particularly 
effective in small quality of life disputes where the money 
involved is miniscule, but the emotional climate between the 
parties is very heated.  By using an arbitrator who is already 
familiar with the dispute, the parties can avoid unnecessary 
expense in educating the arbitrator about the nuances of the 
case.  Despite the benefits of selecting an arbitrator who is 
already familiar with the case, selecting an arbitrator who knows 
one or both parties beforehand may ultimately increase 
animosity between the parties, because the losing party may 
believe the outcome was biased and not based on the merits. 
Parties may also get a greater sense of justice when a 
dispute is decided by an expert rather than a judge or jury.  A 
party may view the judge and jury members as laypeople who do 
not completely understand the issues.  On the other hand, there 
is still the potential that residents will view the process as “fixed” 
if an arbitrator’s professional background makes the arbitrator 
appear more sympathetic to the board or another neighbor.  For 
example, in a dispute over whether a certain activity is allowed 
under the common interest development’s restrictions, if the 
arbitrator has a background in real estate law, the resident may 
view the arbitration award as one made by an “insider,” whose 
natural tendency is to rule in favor of the board. 
Another benefit of using arbitration over litigation is that, 
generally, there is no right to appeal an arbitrator’s decision.  
When parties agree that arbitration will be binding, arbitration 
reduces cost by severely limiting the right of appeal.140  A binding 
arbitration award can only be overturned if it “ ‘was procured by 
corruption, fraud or other undue means,’ or . . . the arbitrator 
displayed various forms of misconduct including ‘exceeding their 
 
137 See 1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 7:43, at 172. 
138 See Librett, supra note 51. 
139 Siegler, supra note 43. 
140 1 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 82, § 43.05[5][a]. 
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powers,’ ‘refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause 
shown,’ or ‘refusing to hear evidence material to the 
controversy.’ ”141  The grounds for overturning an arbitration 
award on appeal have been described as “extremely limited” and 
“arbitration awards are seldom challenged and very rarely 
overturned.”142  In some instances, the finality of binding 
arbitration can also stimulate settlement between the parties 
because one party may be less willing to take a chance with an 
arbitrator whose decision cannot be challenged.143  Generally, 
however, arbitrations are settled much less frequently than 
litigation.144  A limited right of appeal can be desirable in 
common interest development disputes because it creates speedy 
and certain results while preventing smaller value disputes from 
blossoming into costly litigation that engenders permanent 
animosity between the parties. 
A final advantage of arbitration is that it allows for more 
flexible results than litigation.  As discussed above, courts are 
very limited in the relief that they can grant.  In arbitration, on 
the other hand, an arbitrator has much more leeway in crafting 
the relief.145  The federal standard for arbitration is that the 
“remedy must ‘draw its essence’ from the underlying agreement 
that authorizes the arbitration.”146  Also, “[a]rbitrators have the 
power to render such relief as is appropriate to the dispute 
submitted to them as long as the relief does not offend public 
policy or require a result contrary to statute.”147  Therefore, as 
long as arbitrators do not stray too far from the wording of the 
arbitration agreement and applicable law, they can reach 
solutions that are more equitable than those available in court. 
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Furthermore, the parties can anticipate the needs of 
arbitration and shape remedies that will suit specific disputes.148  
For example, the board can include an arbitration agreement in 
the common interest development’s bylaws that includes specific 
remedies for commonly occurring disputes, such as ones 
involving noise, pets, parking, and other quality of life issues.  
The parties to the dispute can either agree to the arbitration 
agreement or the board may be able to force arbitration by 
amending its bylaws.149  Arbitrators have a degree of flexibility 
not available in litigation, and they tend to “split the baby” by 
giving each side a compromised decision in an attempt to satisfy 
both parties.150  Arbitration, however, lacks the degree of 
flexibility available in mediation.151 
Arbitration has several disadvantages.  The primary 
criticism of arbitration is that it is too much like litigation.  In 
both arbitration and litigation, the parties present evidence to a 
neutral decisionmaker who declares a winner and a loser.152  An 
arbitrator, like a judge, “has to say one party is right or 
wrong.”153  In fact, the role of an arbitrator is “not unlike that of a 
judge”; they both perform essentially the same function.154  
Arbitration is also similar to litigation because it is an 
adversarial procedure where the parties concentrate on defeating 
the opposing party, as opposed to searching for common ground 
and compromise.155  Arbitration, like litigation, consists of 
opening statements, direct and cross examination of witnesses, 
and can include closing statements.156  Therefore, arbitration 
retains much of the character and adversarial nature of 
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expensive and time consuming as litigation, and over the past 
twenty to thirty years, arbitration has “bloomed into another 
form of litigation.”157 
Also, arbitration is generally “binding on the parties 
regardless of whether either side agrees with the decision of the 
arbitrator.”158  These types of decisions led to the saying “a good 
compromise is one that leaves both sides equally unhappy.”  This 
may discourage one or both parties from using arbitration in the 
future and thus result in costly lawsuits because both feel they at 
least have an opportunity to achieve their desired result in 
litigation.  There is also “the perception that arbitrators ignore 
the law and tend to apply ‘rough justice’ ” that leads to a “cut-the-
baby” approach, which infuriates a party who feels he has done 
nothing wrong.159  Depending on the circumstances of the 
dispute, a compromised award can be either a positive or 
negative outcome. 
Another potential weakness of arbitration is that in certain 
circumstances, one of the parties may desire publicity and want 
to create precedent.160  If the parties are subject to binding 
arbitration, these goals are not well served.  For example, if a 
resident believes that his co-op board refused to approve the sale 
of a unit because the potential buyer was a minority, the resident 
may very well want to expose the board to negative publicity and 
create binding precedent that would prevent other boards from 
acting in a similar manner.  Privacy is generally a positive 
attribute of arbitration, but it can have negative implications in 
individual cases where the threat of bad publicity can be used as 
a bargaining tool to change board policy or common interest 
development bylaws and restrictions. 
Finally, many of the positive attributes of arbitration 
disappear when arbitration is nonbinding.  If arbitration is  
nonbinding, there may be diminished incentive for parties to 
compromise because they can still go to court afterwards if they 
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do not like the outcome of the arbitration.161  Nonbinding 
arbitration also prematurely exposes a party’s trial strategy 
when presenting the case to an arbitrator.  A party may 
intentionally present a weak case to the arbitrator in order to see 
the other side’s case, knowing that the results are not binding.  
When mandatory, nonbinding arbitration can be just another 
added cost and delay in getting a final resolution to a dispute. 
On the other hand, nonbinding arbitration provides the 
parties with an opportunity to have a neutral decisionmaker 
evaluate their respective cases, which may provide a sobering 
reminder of the realistic strengths and weaknesses of a party’s 
case.  Furthermore, nonbinding arbitration is more like 
mediation than litigation because the parties shape their own 
settlements rather than having one imposed upon them by the 
courts.162 
Arbitration has many significant advantages over litigation, 
but it still retains some of litigation’s weaknesses.  Despite 
arbitration’s limitations, it can be a powerful tool for common 
interest development boards to provide legal costs and provide 
residents a fast and economical solution to their disputes. 
C. Use of Mediation in Condo and Co-op Disputes 
Mediation is another effective method for resolving condo 
and co-op disputes.  Mediation is where parties to a dispute meet 
with a neutral third party to facilitate a settlement.  The aim of 
mediation is to reach a jointly acceptable compromise between 
the parties.  Mediation differs from litigation and arbitration in 
that a mediator does not make any decision regarding the merits 
of the parties’ claims.163  A mediator cannot impose a settlement 
and does not make a binding ruling.164  Mediators aid 
negotiations by defining the issues, removing impediments to 
communication, and investigating possible means of resolving 
the dispute.165  Mediators accomplish these goals by providing a 
framework within which the parties negotiate.  They help control  
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the agenda of the negotiations, clarify misunderstandings 
between the parties, make suggestions for mutually satisfactory 
resolutions, and ensure fairness in the process.166 
Mediation has several advantages over litigation and 
arbitration.  The most significant advantage of mediation is the 
parties’ ability to shape relief that is individually tailored for 
their dispute.  Mediation leaves the parties in control of the 
settlement process, rather than ceding the result to a judge, jury, 
or arbitrator.167  In litigation and arbitration, the relief that can 
be provided is limited by substantive law.168  Additionally, 
arbitrators are also limited by the terms of the arbitration 
agreement.169  Mediators, on the other hand, may suggest 
creative and innovative solutions to help the parties resolve their 
conflict.170  For example, mediators are not constrained to 
recommending monetary relief.  This flexibility is particularly 
helpful in quality of life disputes that arise in common interest 
developments.171 
Bruce A. Cholst, a Manhattan co-op lawyer, provides an 
excellent example of the virtues of mediation for quality of life 
issues in condo and co-op disputes.172  In his scenario, an upstairs 
neighbor has young children that play on hardwood floors, and 
the noise disturbs the downstairs neighbor.173  The upstairs 
neighbors have not violated the condo or co-op restrictions, 
however, because their apartment has the required eighty 
percent carpeting—although not on the areas the children are 
playing.174  While a judge or arbitrator may be powerless to 
address this problem because the upstairs neighbors are 
technically in compliance with the rules, a mediator could 
persuade the upstairs neighbor to add more carpeting, have the 
children play on the existing carpeting, or move the existing 
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carpeting to where the children play.175  Mediators can bypass 
dogmatic adherence to the rules and help reach a compromise 
that best serves the parties’ needs.  Courts and arbitrators lack 
the ability to facilitate the same kind of meaningful settlement 
that a mediator can provide.  However, it is the parties who have 
the responsibility of reaching an acceptable compromise; a 
mediator is merely a catalyst for helping them to reach that 
point.176 
Mediation also offers flexibility in the process used to resolve 
a dispute because “the parties ‘own’ the process.”177  The parties 
decide the logistics and rules, and the mediator guides  
settlement discussions and facilitates communication.  Attorneys 
representing the parties may be present, but they are not 
necessary.178  Also, the parties are free to choose what level of 
presentation of evidence and discovery is appropriate.179  
Typically, mediation does not feature discovery, but the parties 
can agree to exchange documents when appropriate.180  
Additionally, parties do not usually present evidence but can use 
it to educate the mediator about the details of the dispute.181  
Furthermore, the parties can set both when and where mediation 
is to take place.  These relaxed rules in dealing with evidence, 
procedure, and discovery allow parties to explain their position in 
a manner that is not available in a courtroom.182  Mediators do 
not judge the merits of disputes; rather, their job is to help the 
parties reach an agreement.  While mediators lack formal 
decisionmaking authority, they are able to “exert power by 
affecting parties’ perceptions of a dispute, setting the agenda, 
exploring possible outcomes, and drafting the precise wording of 
an agreement.”183 
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Mediation also provides both confidentiality and privacy.  It 
is private because it is not open to the public or the media; only 
the parties may attend.  Similarly, it is confidential because the 
parties cannot disclose the mediation’s settlement negotiations.184  
A mediator is also generally obligated to maintain both privacy 
and confidentiality.185  Confidentiality in mediation may be 
covered by state or federal law.186  Furthermore, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 408 limits the admissibility of mediation proceedings.187 
However, the parties should enter into a confidentiality 
agreement to ensure that statements made during the course of 
the mediation will remain confidential and will be inadmissible 
in court.188  Confidentiality agreements also eliminate any 
ambiguity in interpreting statutory and case law.189  As in 
arbitration, confidentiality during mediation allows the parties to 
fully express their grievances without the fear of publicizing 
private or embarrassing information.  Confidentiality enables the 
parties to express themselves in a candid manner without 
appearing weak to third parties and the public.190  Often, the 
publicity related to a condo or co-op dispute can have a more 
negative impact than the underlying dispute itself.191  
Confidentiality allows parties to fully vent their frustrations and 
anger, resulting in a cathartic effect that helps the sides reach a 
compromise.192  Without confidentiality, the parties will not fully 
participate in negotiations and mediation would be rendered 
ineffective. 
Mediation also preserves the relationship of the parties to a 
dispute.  This is especially important in common interest 
developments because residents and board members will have 
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some level of interaction after a dispute is resolved, regardless of 
the outcome.193  The nature of mediation diminishes enmity and 
hatred by helping parties find common ground and forge an 
agreement, rather than relying on a third party decisionmaker.194  
Mediation helps repair relationships by giving the parties an 
opportunity and forum to address one another face-to-face. 
Even if a settlement is not reached through mediation, the 
parties may lose their hostility toward one another and preserve 
their future relationship.195  Mediation allows the parties to reach 
a “win-win” solution that takes into account the parties’ future 
relationship.196  By opening dialogue between the two sides, 
meditation can also prepare the parties to craft pragmatic 
solutions that give both sides what they want, or at least a 
solution they are willing to accept.197  In contrast, when parties 
go straight to litigation or arbitration, they are often forced into a 
posture where they are unwilling to compromise and one of them 
is nearly certain to be unhappy with the result. 
A related benefit of mediation over litigation and arbitration 
is that it allows for more effective communication between the 
parties.  The goal of mediation is to facilitate the parties’ ability 
to comprehend the interests of both sides, instead of 
concentrating solely on defending one position.198  The 
opportunity to present one’s case and to understand one’s 
opponent helps bring about compromise.199  Mediation allows 
parties to communicate to find mutually acceptable solutions, 
rather than “postur[ing] heavily in hopes of ‘winning.’ ”200  
Parties’ satisfaction with mediation “derives from the 
opportunity to participate actively in the process, voice one’s side 
of the case, and feel that others have listened and understood 
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one’s viewpoint.”201  Mediation is personal in nature and helps 
the parties “develop a sense of investment” in its outcome, which 
enables them to be more open minded when listening to their 
opponent.202  Additionally, the personal contact of mediation 
improves communication and facilitates the process.203  
Furthermore, because the parties in common interest disputes 
fully understand the problem, and because these disputes 
generally involve low dollar amounts, enabling direct 
communication is particularly important.204 
Common interest disputes are often based on “emotional 
issues rather than practical ones” and relatively insignificant 
disputes can quickly escalate.205  Mediation reduces emotional 
barriers to communication that prohibit compromise.206  Again, 
mediation presents a forum that allows parties to purge their 
frustration and reach productive solutions by allowing them to 
openly express their feelings and discuss legally extraneous 
matters.207 
Even if the parties are not communicating directly at first, 
the mediator can facilitate a dialogue by meeting with them 
individually to fully understand their respective positions.  These 
private meetings, known as caucuses, familiarize mediators with 
the details of the dispute.208  Because these meetings are 
confidential, parties can be completely forthright with the 
mediator, who enables them to objectively assess their 
positions.209  However, these private meetings can be 
counterproductive if the parties are working towards an 
agreement on their own and should only be used when they reach 
an impasse.210 
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Private caucuses serve many functions: they help form a 
trusting relationship between the mediator and the parties, they 
allow parties to vent frustrations without disrupting the joint 
session and generating more hostility, and they enable the 
mediator to determine the parties’ needs.211  Also, mediators can 
use these sessions to clarify misunderstandings and gauge 
whether the parties are truly interested in settlement.212  At the 
conclusion of a caucus, a party decides what information the 
mediator may share with the opposing party.213  Also, mediators 
can recommend that parties disclose certain information gleaned 
in a private caucus that the mediator believes will help achieve a 
settlement.214 
The cost of mediation is another advantage over litigation 
and arbitration.  Mediation can frequently be achieved at a 
fraction of the expense of litigation.215  The primary way that 
mediation saves the parties money is by encouraging 
settlement.216  Settlement eliminates the risk of a high jury 
verdict and reduces the amount of legal fees incurred by both 
sides of a dispute.  Also, mediation saves money by facilitating 
document exchange and eliminating much of the cost associated 
with discovery.217  Moreover, mediation is less costly than 
litigation and arbitration because “mediation often resolves the 
dispute in just one or two short sessions of 2 or 3 hours,” as 
opposed to months or years.218  Quality of life disputes in common 
interest developments are the type of conflicts that can be 
resolved quickly through mediation because they do not involve 
complex factual or legal issues.  The speed of mediation reduces 
attorney fees, litigation expense, and indirect costs connected 
with prolonged litigation.219  Additionally, because it is not 
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necessary for a party to be represented by an attorney during 
mediation, the parties are able to save money, especially in small 
dollar quality of life disputes that arise in condos and co-ops.220 
Even an unsuccessful mediation may reduce costs “by 
abbreviating the discovery phase of litigation and defining the 
remaining issues.”221  Furthermore, if mediation fails to produce 
a settlement, it may still ease tensions to the point that the 
parties agree to arbitrate rather than litigate their dispute.222 
Finally, mediation should be considered as an option in 
condo and co-op disputes because of its high success rate.  
Experts vary on the effectiveness of mediation, with estimates 
ranging from seventy percent up to ninety percent.223  However, 
even if mediation is successful only seventy percent of the time, it 
is still a very powerful tool to resolve disputes as quickly, 
cheaply, and painlessly as possible.  Also, litigation or arbitration 
is still available should the parties fail to reach a settlement 
through mediation.224  Litigation can be put on hold while the 
parties attempt to mediate and then be resumed if the mediation 
fails.225 
Despite mediation’s many positive attributes, it is not 
without its disadvantages, and it is not appropriate in all 
circumstances.  One of the most significant limitations on 
mediation is that the parties usually cannot be compelled to 
participate.226  Often the most difficult step in mediation is 
getting the parties to agree to mediate in the first place.227  
Because mediation is normally a voluntary process, the parties  
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must be open to the idea of reaching a compromise.  A 
recalcitrant party has the ability to render mediation ineffective 
from its outset. 
A related disadvantage to mediation is that both parties’ 
desire to settle is necessary for it to succeed.228  If either party 
absolutely refuses to settle, mediation becomes just another 
impediment to achieving a final result—either through litigation 
or arbitration.  Furthermore, if the parties have acted in bad 
faith before attempting to mediate a dispute, the damage to their 
credibility may be an insurmountable obstacle in reaching a 
settlement.229 
Another significant weakness of mediation is that its success 
or failure is heavily dependent on the skill of the individual 
mediator.230  Selection of an experienced mediator with “hands on 
experience solving problems” has been described as “pivotal” to 
the success of mediation.231  Parties to a common interest dispute 
should carefully consider their choice of mediator and ensure 
that he has the proper background, credentials, and experience.  
Regrettably, a large number of individuals offering mediation 
services are ineffective or, worse, they contribute to a mediation’s 
failure.232  In particular, inexperienced or unqualified mediators 
can irreparably damage settlement negotiations by favoring one 
party over another.233  Unfortunately, there are no uniform 
standards for mediators’ education, training, or practice.234 
Mediation also has several other disadvantages.  First, 
mediation may be used as a form of informal discovery by a party 
who is looking to save costs and has no intention of settling.235  
Yet, this is not a significant concern in condo and co-op disputes, 
especially quality of life disputes, because the need for discovery 
for noise complaints or parking issues is not great.  Second, 
mediation, like arbitration, is inappropriate in cases where either 
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of the parties wants to set legal precedent.236  Common interest 
boards may desire a court victory to vindicate their rights and 
prevent other residents from violating restrictions.  On the other 
hand, a condo or co-op resident may want a court to void a 
restriction that is inconsistent with the law.  Finally, settlements 
reached in mediation are unenforceable until the parties enter 
into a binding contract.237  However, it is rare for mediated 
settlements to collapse after mediation is complete.238 
Mediation offers parties to a condo or co-op dispute a cost 
effective and flexible remedy to conflicts that may otherwise 
spiral out of proportion.  In spite of mediation’s short comings, it 
offers an economical alternative to litigation and arbitration that 
helps preserve the parties’ relationship.  Condo and co-op boards 
should strongly consider adding a mediation provision to their 
bylaws or proprietary leases. 
IV. MANDATORY ADR IN CONDO AND CO-OP DISPUTES 
A. The Advantages of Mandatory ADR 
Mandatory ADR requires parties to a dispute to attempt 
mediation or submit to nonbinding arbitration.  Mandatory ADR 
offers a variety of benefits to both residents and boards in 
common interest development disputes.  First, mandatory ADR 
eases overcrowding of court dockets because the vast majority of 
cases settle.239  Second, mandatory ADR discourages frivolous 
claims from the outset by exposing flaws in marginal claims and 
adding an additional layer of time and expense to all claims. 
Mandatory ADR levels the playing field for residents 
involved in condo and co-op disputes by removing personal 
economics from the equation.  Residents in common interest 
developments are often at a significant disadvantage when 
litigating against the board because the board is better able to 
bear the costs of a lawsuit.240  Mandatory ADR prevents the 
board from using litigation as a first resort in an effort to 
discourage residents from pursuing meritorious claims.  Also, in 
 
236 PICKER, supra note 166, § 2.2.3, at 18; see also Field et al., supra note 144, at 
76. 
237 1 GRENIG, supra note 115, § 4:30, at 78. 
238 Goldsmith, supra note 77. 
239 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.1255(3)(b) (West 2010). 
240 See id. § 718.1255(3)(a). 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 997 (2010) 
942 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:907   
disputes between two neighbors, there may be a large disparity 
in the each party’s personal resources.  ADR provides cost 
effective methods of achieving relief, especially in quality of life 
disputes.241 
Another benefit of mandatory ADR is that it forces boards to 
participate in negotiations and helps prevent costly and 
acrimonious litigation.  Many boards do not want to relinquish 
their ability to sue for fear of losing a perceived advantage they 
have in litigation.242  This advantage may vary based on the 
jurisdiction.  For example, Florida courts apply a reasonableness 
standard when reviewing board actions, which prohibits the 
board from adopting “arbitrary or capricious rules bearing no 
relationship to the health, happiness and enjoyment of life of the 
various unit owners.”243  A resident challenging board action in a 
jurisdiction that applies a reasonableness standard must show 
that the board acted unreasonably.  On the other hand, New 
York courts apply a business judgment rule standard when 
reviewing board actions.244  Under this standard, a board’s 
actions made in “good faith,” using “honest judgment,” and in 
“legitimate furtherance of [the common interest development’s] 
purposes” are immune from judicial review.245  Residents 
contesting board action under a business judgment rule standard 
must show that the board breached its fiduciary duty “in the 
form of bad faith, acts outside the board’s authority or 
discriminatory acts.”246  Regardless of the standard applied by a 
particular court, board action enjoys a presumption of validity, 
and it is very difficult for residents to have a board’s decision 
overturned in court.247  Because of the deference courts give to 
boards’ actions, boards are reluctant to give up their advantage  
 
 
241 Id. § 718.1255(3)(d). 
242 Librett, supra note 51 (“Despite the distinct advantages of arbitration and 
mediation over costly litigation, many boards are reluctant to give up their power to 
sue, especially in cases involving themselves, because they feel they may have more 
leverage during litigation.”). 
243 Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1975). 
244 See Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 533, 553 
N.E.2d 1317, 1319, 554 N.Y.S.2d 807, 808 (1990). 
245 See id. at 538, 553 N.E.2d at 1321, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 813. 
246 Mollen, supra note 3, at 83–84 (quoting Richard Siegler, The Aftermath of 
Levandusky, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 2, 1994, at 3). 
247 Id. at 85. 
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by considering arbitration or mediation.  If ADR is ineffective, 
the board would retain its favorable position in a subsequent 
lawsuit. 
Another reason to require ADR in common interest disputes 
is that many parties and their attorneys are hesitant to propose 
mediation because they fear it will be “interpreted as a sign of 
weakness.”248  If ADR is mandatory, the parties can avoid 
posturing and focus on reaching a settlement.  Getting the 
parties to agree to mediation in the first place is the “hardest 
part.”249  By making ADR compulsory, this initial obstacle is 
removed, and many more disputes can be settled in an efficient 
manner.  Furthermore, parties are often afraid “they will be 
forced to compromise” once mediation has begun.250  However, 
mandatory ADR will force the parties to sit down and learn that 
a settlement cannot be imposed upon them. 
The cost of instituting mediation or nonbinding arbitration 
may also discourage a party from considering ADR.251  Parties 
may be reluctant to incur additional attorney fees involved in 
attending and preparing for mediation or nonbinding 
arbitration.252  Furthermore, ADR entails the time and expense 
associated with traveling back and forth to mediation sessions 
and missing time from work.253  However, these expenses can be 
trivial compared to the potential cost savings associated with 
successful ADR.  Mandatory ADR forces the parties to adopt a 
more constructive view of solving the dispute, rather than 
focusing on short term expenses.  Substantive and procedural 
safeguards can minimize the unnecessary cost of mediation or 
nonbinding arbitration by setting limits on the time and expense 
of mediation.254  Residents also benefit from the lower cost of 
“invoking a neutral resolution process” in compulsory ADR 
because the procedures and infrastructure are well established.255 
 
248 PICKER, supra note 166, § 2.7. 
249 Romano, supra note 79 (quoting Benjamin Sands, a professional mediator in 
New York). 
250 Id. 




255 See Alternative Dispute Resolution in Common Interest Developments, supra 
note 46, at 700. 
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Finally, mandatory ADR alleviates problems caused by the 
use of unqualified mediators.  States that require ADR have 
instituted education, training, and qualification standards for 
mediators.256  Establishing official guidelines for mandatory ADR 
ensures that “[e]xpert neutral personnel can effectively evaluate 
the resolution mechanism that appears most appropriate for the 
particular dispute, and assist in resolution of the dispute.”257  
Mandatory ADR provides the framework to implement formal 
training, education, and certification of mediators and 
arbitrators, which promotes solutions to condo and co-op 
disputes.  State action is needed because many boards are simply 
unaware of ADR’s benefits or refuse to use ADR.258 
B. States That Have Adopted Mandatory ADR in Condo and  
Co-op Disputes 
Several state and local governments have enacted statutes 
requiring mandatory ADR.259  The use of mandatory ADR is 
varied in application, and each state has taken a slightly 
different approach.  Each of the following states provides an 
example of how mandatory ADR can be implemented. 
1. Florida 
Florida mandates ADR for condominium260 and co-op261  
disputes, with certain exceptions.262  The Florida statutes govern 
 
256 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.1255(4) (West 2010) (noting that Florida employs 
arbitrators and regulates outside arbitrators); id. at § 718.1255(4)(f) (noting that 
mediators must be certified); see also Apfelberg, supra note 141 (discussing Nevada’s 
requirement that mediator-arbitrators have at least five years experience). 
257 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENTS: TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION 10 (2002), 
available at  http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/Misc-Report/TR-CID-ADR.pdf. 
258 See Grosberg, supra note 7, at 509 n.44 (noting that mediation clauses have 
only recently become standard in co-op leases). 
259 In addition to the states and statutes discussed below, see N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46:8B-14(k) (West 2010) (New Jersey law requiring common interest developments 
to provide an alternative to litigation); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1345(b) (West 2010) 
(California law requiring a party, in limited circumstances, to “endeavor” to submit 
disputes to ADR before bring a lawsuit); N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 22, § 28.2(b) (2010) (New 
York administrative rule requiring disputes less than $6,000—or $10,000 in New 
York City Civil Court—that are not in small claims part to be submitted to 
arbitration); MONTGOMERY CNTY. (MD.) CODE ch. 10B (2010) (requiring mandatory 
ADR once disputes have been submitted to the commission). 
260 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.1255. 
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disputes involving a board’s actions, or failure to act, based on its 
bylaws or applicable law and certain board election and meeting 
requirements.263  A party to a condo or co-op dispute must submit 
a petition for nonbinding arbitration before it can file a 
lawsuit.264  Filing for arbitration tolls the statute of limitations.265  
Once a petition has been filed, any party can request that the 
dispute be referred to mediation.266  Mediation is commenced 
either by agreement of the parties or a referral by the 
arbitrator.267  The parties then select a mediator or, if they 
cannot agree, one is appointed by the arbitrator.268  Parties must 
attend the mediation or risk sanctions.269  Also, the parties will 
split the cost of mediation, “unless they agree otherwise.”270 
Once mediation is commenced, the process is confidential; 
the arbitrator cannot consider the mediation proceedings should 
they fail.271  Furthermore, if the mediator declares an impasse, 
the parties can agree to arbitration, either nonbinding or 
binding, or terminate arbitration and proceed to litigation.272  If 
the parties agree to nonbinding arbitration, the arbitrator’s 
decision is admissible in court if the parties later litigate.273  A 
nonbinding decision will become enforceable by the parties if 
neither party files a lawsuit within thirty days.274  If, however, a 
party commences a lawsuit and fails to obtain a judgment that is 
“not more favorable than the arbitration decision,” then that 
party is liable for the other party’s arbitration fees—including 
attorney’s fees—and expenses.275 
 
261 Id. § 719.1255 (applying the language of section 718.1255 of the Florida Code 
to co-op disputes). 
262 See id. § 718.1255(1). 
263 Id. § 718.1255(1)(a)–(b). 
264 Id. § 718.1255(4)(a); see also id. § 718.1255(4)(b) (detailing the requirements 
for the petition). 
265 Id. § 718.1255(4)(i). 
266 Id. § 718.1255(4)(e). 
267 Id. 
268 Id. § 718.1255(4)(f). 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. § 718.1255(4)(h). 
272 Id. 
273 Id. § 718.1255(4). 
274 Id. § 718.1255(4)(k). 
275 Id. § 718.1255(4)(l). 
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2. Nevada 
Nevada also requires parties to a condo or co-op dispute to 
resort to ADR prior to instituting a lawsuit.276  Nevada created 
an Ombudsman position to explain to the parties their rights, to 
process claims submitted to arbitration, and to perform a variety 
of administrative functions.277  The Ombudsman also attempts to 
mediate the dispute before it is referred to formal meditation or 
arbitration.278  If the Ombudsman cannot help the parties reach a 
settlement, the case is referred to a certified mediator-
arbitrator.279  Commencing arbitration or mediation tolls any 
applicable statute of limitations.280  The parties are free to choose 
mediation, nonbinding arbitration, or arbitration,281  but, if they 
cannot agree on the form of ADR, nonbinding arbitration will be 
used to settle the dispute.282  The party instituting ADR must 
serve an opponent with the claim and an explanation of Nevada’s 
mediation and arbitration procedures in condo and co-op 
disputes.283  An arbitrator is either chosen by the parties from 
three names supplied by the Ombudsman or, if the parties 
cannot agree, the Ombudsman appoints one.284  If the parties fail 
to reach an acceptable resolution through mediation or 
nonbinding arbitration, they are free to file a lawsuit. 
 
276 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.310(1) (West 2010). But see id. § 38.300(3) 
(excluding a civil action for an injunction and one relating to title of residential 
property from mandatory alternative dispute resolution). 
277 See id. § 116.625. 
278 Apfelberg, supra note 141. 
279 Id. (explaining that arbitrators are either agreed upon by the parties or 
appointed by the Ombudsman and that arbitrators must have at least five years of 
arbitration experience); see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.340(1) (requiring the 
Real Estate Division of the Department of Business and Industry to provide a list of 
available mediators and arbitrators). 
280 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.350. 
281 Id. § 38.320(1)(c). 
282 See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 38.350(5)–(6). 
283 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.320(3); see also id. § 38.340(2) (requiring the Real 
Estate Division of the Department of Business and Industry to establish and 
maintain a “document . . . contain[ing] a written explanation of the procedures for 
mediating and arbitrating claims”); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 38.350(1) (requiring service 
of “written claim and the statement explaining the procedures for mediation and 
arbitration on the opposing party within 45 days after filing the claim”). 
284 Apfelberg, supra note 141. 
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3. Hawaii 
Hawaii’s approach to mandatory ADR is slightly different 
than other states that require ADR in condo and co-op disputes.  
Hawaii does not require ADR as a prerequisite for filing a 
lawsuit.  However, once either party to a condo dispute requests 
mediation285 or arbitration,286 the other party must participate.287  
If the other party refuses to participate in mediation, a court can 
consider the refusal when awarding costs and fees, including 
attorney’s fees.288  However, the parties normally pay their own 
costs associated with mediation.289  Once mediation is 
commenced, the parties are required to participate for two 
months, but they may agree to continue beyond that.290 
In arbitration, the parties are not bound by the rules of 
evidence, except those relating to privileged communications, and 
the arbitrator has the ability to restrict the scope of discovery if it 
causes excessive delays or cost.291  Also, the arbitrator has the 
sole discretion to award fees in the arbitration.292  An arbitrator 
must always provide an award in writing293 and, if requested by a 
party, provide findings of fact and conclusions of law.294  If either 
party is not satisfied with the result of arbitration, they must file 
a lawsuit “within ten days after service of the arbitration 
award.”295  The arbitration award is inadmissible at trial.296  If, 
however, the party demanding a trial “does not prevail at trial,” 
that party is liable for the “costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees of 
the trial.”297 
 
285 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514B-161 (West 2010). 
286 See id. § 514B-162. 
287 See id. §§ 514B-161(a), -162(a). But see id. § 514B-161(b) (listing certain 
disputes that are not subject to mandatory mediation); id. § 514B-162(b) (listing 
certain disputes that are not subject to mandatory arbitration); see also id. § 514B-
162(c) (setting forth the procedure for disputing the applicability of mandatory 
arbitration). 
288 Id. § 514B-161(a). 
289 Id. 
290 Id. § 514B-161(c). 
291 Id. § 514B-162(a). 
292 Id. § 514B-162(e). 
293 Id. § 514B-162(f). 
294 Id. § 514B-162(g). 
295 Id. § 514B-163(b). 
296 See id. § 514B-163(c). 
297 Id. § 514B-163(d). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Condo and co-op ownership has exploded in recent years and 
will likely continue to increase in the future.  To avoid costly 
litigation that has accompanied the boom in common interest 
developments, boards should require ADR for certain disputes.  
Although alternative dispute resolution is not appropriate for 
every type of dispute, it offers a quick, cheap, and private way to 
resolve differences.  Furthermore, a board can tailor an 
arbitration or mediation clause however they see fit.  For 
example, ADR could be limited to disputes under a certain dollar 
amount or certain causes of action could be excluded from ADR.  
However, mediation should be required in every dispute because 
it will force parties to come to the bargaining table and facilitate 
settlements.  By requiring parties to mediate, far more cases will 
be resolved at the beginning stages before high costs are incurred 
and parties become entrenched in their positions.  Parties who 
refuse to settle in mediation will incur slightly higher costs than 
if they had proceeded directly to litigation.  However, the benefit 
of quickly settling a larger amount of cases justifies subjecting 
recalcitrant parties to the added expense.  Additionally, boards 
should use a combination of mediation and arbitration for certain 
disputes; if mediation fails, the parties will then have to arbitrate 
their dispute. 
Because common interest development boards are hesitant 
to adopt ADR and cede their advantage in litigation, state 
legislatures should enact laws requiring ADR.  There are a 
variety of legislative approaches to mandatory ADR in condos 
and co-ops, and legislators are free to choose a scheme that best 
serves the public.  These laws can be tailored to cover disputes 
that should be arbitrated, while allowing other disputes to 
proceed directly to court.  By requiring parties to use ADR, 
legislatures will prevent one side from appearing weak if he 
suggests that a dispute be mediated or arbitrated.  Additionally, 
mandatory ADR will help ease congested court dockets and 
ultimately save both the parties and the state money. 
 
